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 Reciprocated Unilateralism in Trade Reforms with Majority Voting
I. Introduction
Reciprocal tariﬀ reductions in the context of trade negotiations have been extensively stud-
ied in the theoretical literature on international trade.1 Recently, however, the literature has
also begun studying the potential interdependence of trade policies across countries even in
the absence of trade negotiations, speciﬁcally the role of unilateral (i.e., unconditional) liber-
alization in securing a reciprocal reduction in trade barriers by partners.2 Interdependencies
of this nature carry important normative implications. The policy of using unconditional
liberalization to induce reciprocity by partners stands in contrast to conventional policy
wisdom regarding the use (or the threat) of one’s trade barriers to remove those of others.
Understanding the channels that link trade policies across countries is important from a pos-
itive standpoint as well as it may help us understand better particular episodes of reforms
undertaken by countries.
In this paper, we explore the link between unilateralism and reciprocity in a context in which
the decision to carry out a trade reform is determined by its popular political support. That
1Thus, for instance, Mayer (1981) showed that in the presence of terms of trade motivations for tariﬀs,
international negotiations could lead to a better outcome than the non-cooperative Nash outcome derived
earlier by Johnson (1953). Equally, political economy inﬂuences have been considered in models explaining
agreed-upon reciprocal trade liberalization in the work of Mayer (1984), Grossman and Helpman (1995),
Hillman and Moser (1996) and Bagwell and Staiger (1999), among others. For exhaustive surveys of the
theory and evidence on trade and other kinds of policy reforms, see Rodrik (1994, 1995).
2For instance, Coates and Ludema (2001) have argued that in the presence of “political risk” of domestic
opposition to trade agreements, unilateral tariﬀ reduction − by lowering the political stakes associated with
trade liberalization in the foreign country − may increase the likelihood of a successful outcome in a trade
negotiation. In a diﬀerent economic environment, where trade policy is endogenously determined by the
interaction between the government and organized interest groups, Krishna and Mitra (2004) have argued
that unilateral trade liberalization in one country may induce reciprocity in partner countries by encouraging
the formation (or increasing the relative strength) of the relevant interest groups there − that is, reciprocal
liberalization may come about even in the absence of any trade negotiations. See Bhagwati (2002) for a
general discussion. For some interesting recent explanations of the generally observed anti-trade bias in trade
policy see also Limao and Panagariya (2003, 2004).
1is, trade policy changes are voted upon by the public and outcomes are determined by the
majority (as, for instance, in Mayer (1981) and Fernandez and Rodrik (1991)).3 We model
a two-good, two-country trading world in which output in each country is produced by
individuals with diﬀering relative productivities in the two sectors (as in Mayer (1998)). In
the home country, any proposed trade reforms pit (loosely speaking) individuals in losing
(import-competing ) sectors against those in the winning (exportable) sectors but to varying
extents (as workers vary in their relative productivities). In this setting, we demonstrate
how unilateral trade liberalization by a trade partner may increase the voting support for
trade liberalization in the home country. Speciﬁcally, a reduction in tariﬀs by a partner
country which increases the world price of the exportable of the home country (and thus
lowers the relative price of the importable) lowers the relative wage advantage from working
in the home country’s import-competing sector. Some workers in the import competing
sector prior to the reforms may have previously opposed a move to free trade in the home
economy but will now support this move. With a large enough movement in the relative
price of the importable good, the protected home economy may then gain majority support
for free trade.4.
3In contrast to the literature on trade policy that analyzes the political inﬂuence exercised by organized
lobbies, the majority voting approach emphasizes democratic pressures on government policy-making. As
Alesina and Rodrik (1994) argue, “any government is likely to be responsive to the wishes of the majority
when key distributional issues are at stake. Even a dictator cannot completely ignore social demands for
fear of being overthrown. Thus, even in a dictatorship, distributional issues aﬀecting the majority of the
population will inﬂuence policy outcomes.” Empirical support for the majority voting model has recently
been provided by Dutt and Mitra (2002), who use cross-country data to examine the predictions of the model
regarding trade policy.
4We should note that the type of result demonstrated in the paper is indeed possible in the classic
Johnson (1953) analysis of optimal tariﬀs if the tariﬀ reaction functions there are upward sloping. There
too, a unilateral tariﬀ reduction by one country would result in tariﬀ reductions by the partner (again,
if the partner’s tariﬀ reaction function is upward sloping). However, it should be clear that our analysis
diﬀers in signiﬁcant theoretical (and ﬁnally empirically relevant) ways from the Johnsonian analysis. In
our framework, a unilateral liberalization by a country would aﬀect even a “small” country’s trade policies,
whereas in the Johnsonian analysis, a small open economy keeps its tariﬀs ﬁxed at zero − independently
of the tariﬀs imposed by the large partner country. Furthermore, in Johnson’s analysis, upward sloping
reaction functions can only be derived if partner export supply elasticities are falling in partner country
tariﬀs. Our results do not depend upon this monotonic elasticity relationship whose empirical validity itself
2When trade policies are determined simultaneously in the two countries, we show the pos-
sibility of multiple political equilibria − one in which both countries are protectionist and
another in which both freely trade with each other. Starting with trade protection in both
countries, a unilateral reform in one country is thus shown to bring about a free trade
equilibrium (a self-enforcing state) that is consistent with majority voting in both countries.
II. A Model with Majority Voting
Consider an economy with two sectors, M (import-competing) and E (exportable). We
assume that both goods in this economy are produced under constant returns to scale using
labor alone. However, diﬀerent individuals have diﬀerent levels of productivities in the
production of the two goods. Thus, we denote by hM
i the labor productivity of individual i
in sector M and by hE
i her productivity in sector E. Let p∗ be the world relative price of
good M. Thus, its domestic price is p = p∗(1 + t) where t is the ad valorem import tariﬀ,
which takes the value t prior to the trade reform and zero once the reform takes place.
A person works in the sector that pays her a higher wage determined by her productivity.
She decides to work in sector E if hE
i >p h M
i , i.e., if hE
i /hM
i >p .Thus, her comparative
advantage in the production of the export good is hE
i /hM
i , which needs to be greater than the
relative price p of the import-competing good for her to decide to work in the export sector.
Let us rank individuals in decreasing order of their comparative advantage in E production.






is therefore decreasing in n.
Let there be a continuum of individuals in the economy and let their total mass or measure be
may be questioned (indeed most textbook treatments consider the opposite case − that of downward sloping
reaction functions)
3normalized to unity. In equilibrium, the marginal worker will be indiﬀerent between working
in the export and import sectors. Thus, the equilibrium mass of individuals n∗ working in
the export sector is the solution to the equation
R(n)=p (2)
and so the equilibrium mass working in the other sector is 1 − n∗.
Let us assume that individuals have identical Cobb-Douglas preferences, so that each indi-
vidual has an indirect utility function given by
V (p,I)=v(p)I = I/p
γ, (3)
where γ is the exponent on the consumption of the importable in the Cobb-Douglas utility
function. If incomes of individuals in the E sector prior to the reforms were derived purely
from their labor (in other words, if they were not provided any of the tariﬀ revenue), then
we can unambiguously show that individuals who were originally in this sector will beneﬁt
from these reforms. The utility of such an individual prior to these reforms is less than









where the left-hand side is the pre-reform utility and the right-hand side is the post-reform
utility.5 Thus, all individuals who remain in the E sector prior to the reforms support
5In this context, it is appropriate to bring in the issue of the distribution of tariﬀ revenue across the
population. One alternative is to follow Fernandez and Rodrik in assuming that the tariﬀ revenue is dis-
tributed solely among workers originally in sector E. We can then restrict the factor endowments and/or
the distribution of individual comparative advantage to be such that the above factor-income-based ranking
(by the original E sector workers) of the pre- and post-reform situations remain completely unchanged (de-
spite redistributing all the tariﬀ revenue to this group of workers). Thus, the other groups of workers (that
move from M to E and that remain in M) will base their decisions solely on factor-income-driven utility
calculations. Alternative assumptions that give us factor-income-driven rankings of the two situations for
all relevant groups are that (1) government oﬃcials consume the tariﬀ revenue and they form a negligible
proportion of the population or (2) a small proportion of the population engage in rent-seeking activities
and they expend resources to grab all or part of the tariﬀ revenue that they may share with government
oﬃcials.
4reforms.
We compare next the pre- and post-reform utility levels of those individuals who were orig-
inally in the M sector and remain there in the post reform equilibrium. As can be seen
from inequality (5) below, all of them are worse oﬀ since the pre-reform utility of such an
individual (appearing on the left-hand-side of (5)) is clearly less than the post-reform level









Finally, we look at the individuals who were in sector M prior to the reforms but are in
sector E in the post-reform equilibrium. In other words, they end up moving from M to E,
which is a relatively more lucrative sector for them after the reforms. Note that given the
post-reform relative prices, E might be relatively more lucrative but some of these people
may be worse oﬀ relative to their pre-reform situation in which the domestic relative price
was diﬀerent. Prior to the reform, the utility of such an individual was [p∗(1 + t)]
1−γ hM
i
and after the reform, her utility is p∗−γhE
i . It is easy to show that the ranking of the two
states is not the same for all individuals who moved at the implementation of reforms. All








that is, post-reform, they are better oﬀ in sector E.












for some of these individuals. Thus, in order to calculate how many people support the







5which in turn is
p
∗(1 + t)
1−γ = R(n). (9)
We denote the solution to this equation by ns, the number of people supporting the reforms.6
Next, we see how this support for reforms responds to the world relative price of imports










p∗(1 − γ)(1 + t)−γ
R ´ (n)
< 0. (10)
In other words, the support for the reform is decreasing in the world relative price of imports
as well as the initial tariﬀ. And so a trade reform takes place when the world price is below
a certain threshold. This threshold world price is the one that solves the following equation:
p
∗(1 + t)
1−γ = R(0.5) (11)
With the aid of Figure I, we try to illustrate what constitutes the support for reforms in
a country. Domestic voters, indexed by n, are represented on the X-axis while prices are
represented on the y-axis. R(n)=hE
n/hM
n is the downward sloping curve indicating the
relative productivity of workers in the exportable sector. The pre-reform domestic relative
price of the importable initially is given by p∗(1+t) and the initial equilibrium is represented
by A∗ with workers to the left of A∗ allocated to the exportable sector and the rest to the
import-competing sector. The post-reform domestic relative price is given by p∗ and the
6Let n∗
R and n∗
T be the proportion of the population working in the export sector in the reformed and
in the tariﬀ-ridden states of the economy respectively. Then, all the n∗
T people that originally were and
remain in sector E support the reforms. In addition, (ns − n∗
T) of the (n∗
R − n∗
T) people moving to E after
the reforms also support the reforms.
6post-reform equilibrium is represented by C∗ . In other words, after the reform workers to
the left of C∗ are allocated to the exportable sector and the rest to the import competing
sector. As proved above, workers to the left of A∗ (i.e., the workers who are always in the
export sector, both pre- and post-reform) will always support the reform because for them
the reforms just mean a pure terms of trade gain. Workers to the right of C∗ (i.e., the
workers who are always in the import-competing sector, both pre- and post-reform) will
always oppose the reform because for them the reforms mean a pure terms of trade loss
and nothing else. The workers in between A∗ and C∗ (i.e., the workers who were in the
import-competing sector prior to the reform but work in export sector after the reform) will
be split in their support for the reforms. Everyone to the left of B∗ supports the reform and
everyone to the right of it is against it. Clearly, the supporters of the reform include people
who always work in the export sector and some of the people who, after the reforms, move
from the import-competing sector to the export sector. These are the movers who have
a greater comparative advantage in producing the export good as compared to the other
movers, and therefore ﬁnd their post-reform position in the export sector relatively more
attractive as compared to their pre-reform position in the import-competing sector.
Figure II helps us analyze the comparative static exercise where a large partner country
reduces its tariﬀ, which in turn moves the world terms of trade in favor of the small home
country. The world relative price of the importable goes down as a result from p∗ to p
0. A∗,






respectively. In other words, the labor allocation to the
export sector and therefore output in that sector increase both pre- and post-reform. The
support for the reform also increases. Both the world terms of trade and the domestic terms
of trade have moved in favor of the home country’s export sector, which makes working in
this sector relativelymore attractive. This also increases the support for the reform. From an
initial situation where the support for the reform is below 50 percent (at B∗), the economy,
upon liberalization in its partner country, moves to a situation where the support is above
750 percent (at B
0
). Thus reforms in the partner country lead to reforms at home.7
II.1 Large Countries
We next consider the case of two large open economies trading with each other. The home
country’s exportable and importable are E and M respectively, while it is the reverse for the
foreign country. In this case, the world relative price of the importable will be a function of
the tariﬀs of the two countries. Let the domestic and foreign tariﬀs be t and t∗ respectively.








2 > 0. (12)
In this case (with t again representing the pre-reform home tariﬀ), the support for the reform















γ [1 + t]
1−γ. It is easy to see that Ω2 > 0a sp∗
2 > 0. If
we rule out the paradoxical possibility that the domestic price may fall with an increase in












7Our theoretical result regarding reciprocal reforms at home clearly depends on changes in the terms of
trade that come about due to the initial reforms in the partner country. In an interesting study investigating
(somewhat analogously) the impact of terms of trade changes on domestic policy, Hanson and Spilimbergo
(2001) ﬁnd that positive price shocks to sectors in the US intensive in the use of “undocumented labor”
result in reductions of border enforcement preventing illegal immigration.
8In this case, again, a trade reform in the partner country raises support for reforms in the
home country. We again get the result that there is a negative relationship between initial
home tariﬀ and the support for reform.
In Figure III, we draw the home tariﬀ as a function of the foreign tariﬀ. If the foreign
tariﬀ is very high, there is insuﬃcient support at home for reform and home is stuck at
its initial tariﬀ. For a foreign tariﬀ below a critical level (given by the solution to the
equation Ω(t,t∗)=R(0.5)), there is majority support for the reform and the tariﬀ drops to
zero. Thus, R1 is the home country’s reaction function. Similarly, we can draw the foreign
country’s reaction function R2 which conveys the same idea. Figure III shows the possibility
of multiple equilibria − either both countries liberalize or both countries remain stuck at
their respective initial tariﬀs. With multiple equilibria, we have a coordination problem
here in that the two countries might get stuck in the worse political-economy equilibrium
− protection in both countries. If people in each of the two countries are pessimistic about
how people are going to behave in the other country with regard to trade policy, we will
indeed be stuck in such an equilibrium. Nevertheless, a reform forced on any one of these
countries (either by a dictatorial leader or a multilateral agency such as the IMF or the World
Bank) against the will of the majority can result in a reciprocal reform in the partner country
(supported by the majority). The partner country’s reciprocal reform implies that the reform
imposed on the home country will now have popular political support, thus resulting in a
new self-enforcing state.
II.2 Individual-Speciﬁc Uncertainty
Fernandez and Rodrik (1991) introduce individual-speciﬁc uncertainty regarding the beneﬁt
from reforms in order to capture resistance to reforms and status-quo bias in the implemen-
tation of reforms. For our analysis, we do not need uncertainty of any kind. However, we
9would still like to discuss how a reduction in the world relative price of the import-competing
good will aﬀect the outcome in their model. In the Fernandez-Rodrik model, the workers
in the export sector always support the tariﬀ reform as they beneﬁt from it. People who
move from the import to the export sector after the reform also beneﬁt. However, there
is uncertainty about who will be able to move even though the number of people who will
move is known. Thus, even if the majority will ultimately gain from reforms, there may be
resistance to reforms if less than 50 percent of the workers are originally in the export sector
and at the same time the expected (ex ante) net beneﬁt from reforms for all those who are
originally in the import sector is negative.
There are two important factors that could lead to a higher support for the reform with
a lower p∗ in a small open economy. A lower p∗ ﬁrst means that there are initially more
people in the export sector to begin with (all of whom support the reform) and thus there
are fewer people facing the (individual-speciﬁc) uncertain eﬀects of the reforms. Second, the
real wage diﬀerential in favor of the export sector is also going to be higher, a factor that
has a positive impact on the expected net beneﬁt of those people originally engaged in the
production of the importable.
III. Conclusions
Can unilateral trade liberalization by one country lead to reciprocal liberalization by its
partner in the absence of negotiations? In this paper, we explore this causal linkage between
unilateralism and reciprocity in the context of a model in which the decision to carry out a
trade reform is determined by its popular political support. In this framework, trade policy
changes are voted upon by the public and outcomes are determined by the majority. We
demonstrate that unilateral trade liberalization by a trading partner increases the (voting)
support for trade liberalization in the home country. More speciﬁcally, if a partner country
10reduces its tariﬀ, the world price of the importable of the home country will go down and
the support for a trade reform in the partner country will go up. When trade policies are
determined simultaneously in the two countries, we show the possibility of multiple political
equilibria − one in which both countries are protectionist and another in which they both
trade freely with each other.
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Figure III